Incredible
"Incredible" is the only word that came to mind after reading John Lumpkin's summary of the new Iraq Survey Group report. I got wind of what was actually in the report last night, and was curious as to the spin.
The headline tells it all: "U.S. Report: Iraq didn't have WMDs".
The story goes on in detail about the lack of WMDs, but skirts or avoids altogether the other issues contained in the report.
The group's finding that Iraq had plans to restart its WMD program as soon as sanctions is lifted was covered (or obscured) this way, in the 15th and 16th paragraphs:
In other words, the reporter wrote a rebuttal to a charge he refused to cover.
Also noted, next-to-last paragraph, is that Duelfer (head of the ISG) believed sanctions could not have been sustained. So putting two and two together, Iraq was going to restart WMDs after sanctions were lifted, and sanctions could not be maintained long-term.
But at least some of that information was included in the story, buried though it was. What did not seem important to Mr. Lumpkin, however, were the following assertions in the report:
Hat tip to Captain's Quarters.
Update: Here's a link to the Darfur Report. Check out the Key Findings.
The headline tells it all: "U.S. Report: Iraq didn't have WMDs".
The story goes on in detail about the lack of WMDs, but skirts or avoids altogether the other issues contained in the report.
The group's finding that Iraq had plans to restart its WMD program as soon as sanctions is lifted was covered (or obscured) this way, in the 15th and 16th paragraphs:
Saddam's intentions to restart his weapons programs were never formalized.
"The former regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions," the summary says. "Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policymakers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them."
In other words, the reporter wrote a rebuttal to a charge he refused to cover.
Also noted, next-to-last paragraph, is that Duelfer (head of the ISG) believed sanctions could not have been sustained. So putting two and two together, Iraq was going to restart WMDs after sanctions were lifted, and sanctions could not be maintained long-term.
But at least some of that information was included in the story, buried though it was. What did not seem important to Mr. Lumpkin, however, were the following assertions in the report:
- According to a memo to Saddam, a member of French Parliament assured an Iraqi intelligence operative that France would use its U.N. Security council veto in response to any attempt by America to attack Iraq.
- Saddam funded foreign activists who were working to end sanctions.
- Oil-for-food vouchers were given to many French, Russian, and Chinese diplomats in the hopes of buying a veto.
- The French were promised large oil deals once sanctions were lifted.
- Saddam fooled his own generals about the lack of WMDs, wanting to keep the illusion to deter not only Israel and Iran, but possible Iraqi insurgents.
Hat tip to Captain's Quarters.
Update: Here's a link to the Darfur Report. Check out the Key Findings.
Comments