The Times' Tubes
I'll try to sum up the debate as briefly and fairly as possible: In early 2001, Iraq attempted to buy 60,000 7075-T6 aluminum tubes from a manufacturer in Hong Kong. The tubes were to be machined to extremely tight tolerances. Such tubes, it was believed, were strong enough and light enough to be spun in a centrifuge at speeds necessary to enrich uranium. It was for this reason that Iraq was prohibited from importing 7075-T6 tubes of certain sizes.
The CIA sounded the alarm. Investigation by the Energy Department found problems with the theory. The tubes did not seem to be the right size or shape for their intended function. The CIA shot back that while they may not match specifications for modern centrifuges used by developed nations (and these specifications would be classified), they did seem to fit specifications for a German centrifuge dating back to the 1950s (which would have been available to the Iraqis).
Upon closer examination, the Iraqi tubes were three times thicker than the German tubes. However, the Iraqi tubes did exactly match specifications for certain rockets, which is what the Iraqis and the Energy Department concluded they were for. However, the Energy Department never said the tubes could not be used for a centrifuge.
The debate raged for well over a year, and the Bush administration began to cite the existence of the tubes as part of their case against Saddam.
The Times piece cites examples of where Vice President Cheney claimed Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, and that we had irrefutable evidence to that effect. Cheney did not publicly acknowledge any dissenting opinions about the purpose of the tubes.
Still, it seems to the end, the CIA stuck by their story on the tubes, and the White House, aware of dissent, went with the CIA.
This is important. It once again underlines the case for intelligence reform, and that CIA failures did not necessarily stop on 9/11.
This is not, of course, the conclusion we are to draw from the Times piece. The Times concludes:
In the end, Mr. Powell put his personal prestige and reputation behind the C.I.A.'s ube theory.
"When we came to the aluminum tubes," Richard A. Boucher, the State Department spokesman, said in an interview, "the secretary listened to the discussion of the various views among intelligence agencies, and reflected those issues in his presentation. Since his task at the U.N. was to present the views of the United States, he went with the overall judgment of the intelligence community as reflected by the director of central intelligence."
As Mr. Powell summed it up for the United Nations, "People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind these illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program: the ability to produce fissile material."
Six weeks later, the war began.
"We were misled!" is the only possible inference. I find this misleading. Were the tubes the only piece of evidence used to justify the war, they might have a point. In fact, the tubes were a part of the nuclear case (to be sure, most of it), which were just part of the WMD case, which was just part of the reason for war.
The Times acknowledges that Cheney wanted to hear all the evidence, asked probing questions, and was cautious about accepting any assessment because of our intelligence failures before the Gulf War (we did not realize Saddam was as close as he was to being nuclear) and of course 9/11. Cheney realized we did not know everything that we needed to know, and that we might never know for sure.
However, post-9/11, Cheney also knew that the United States could not give a man with the reputation of Saddam Hussein the benefit of the doubt.
The Times, in portraying Democrats as being more cautious in evidence-gathering than the Bush administration, reveals a telling quote that contrasts with Cheney's view:
Tom Daschle, the South Dakota Democrat and Senate majority leader, was more cautious. "What has changed over the course of the last 10 years, that brings this country to the belief that it has to act in a pre-emptive fashion in invading Iraq?" he asked.
Saddam may not have been reconstituting his nuclear program (though check Stephen's piece the other day before drawing any conclusions), But Bush and Cheney were not about to take any chances. They gave Saddam a final opportunity come clean and meet the demands of the international community. They drew a line in the sand.
What has changed over the course of the last 10 years, aside from our previous sense of invulnerability, is America's President. This president does not draw a second line after the first one is crossed. This president will not hinge America's security on the word of a madman, and this president will not impose his Christian beliefs on all Americans by "turning the other cheek" after being attacked on our own soil.
After 10,000 words, the Times convinced me that Dick Cheney and Colin Powell may have pushed the tubes issue too hard. However, they will not convince me that the case for war has been diminished in the least.
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